The relationship between populism and ethno-territorial politics has emerged repeatedly in empirical studies outside Western Europe. This article presents the main aim of the special issue, which is the systematic and empirically based investigation of the linkages between populism and ethno-territorial ideologies in Western European states. By introducing a conceptual map, in which the defining characteristics of populism, regionalism, statenationalism, and Euroscepticism are identified and conceptualized, the article proceeds with the possible linkage points between both concepts. It also proposes a smallest common denominator relationship between populism and ethno-territorial ideologies in that the notion of 'homogeneous people' becomes inexorably connected to the concept of 'nation' or 'region' pitted against political, economic, and cultural elites operating at various levels of government.
Introduction
The scholarship on populism outside Western Europe has often identified center-periphery dynamics and ethno/racial diversity as strictly linked to populist mobilizations. Centreperiphery dynamics have featured prominently both in Northern and Latin America. In the US, until very recently, populism has been primarily identified as the expression of malcontent of the (communitarian) deep Mid-West and/or South against the (liberal) 'Coastal elites' (Pollak, 1962; Nugent, 1963; Palmer, 1980; Carter, 1996; Savage, 2012) . In Canada, populist movements of different ideological orientations have primarily emerged in the Western peripheries in contraposition to the elites of 'Central Canada' (Conway, 1979; Laycock, 1990; Nevitt, 1998) . For long time, populism in Latin America was primarily conceived as a macroeconomic strategy-i.e., Import Substitution Industrialization (Dornbush and Edwards, 1991 )-aimed to cope with the peripheral position of that world region vis-à-vis the centers of the world economy (i.e. US and Western Europe). In addition, in more recent studies, a clear centre-periphery dynamic has been identified within and across individual states; for instance in the relationship between the Andean mountain areas and the plains (Dunkerley, 2007) .
Similarly, ethnic and racial diversity has featured prominently in the study of populism in the US, in Latin America, in India and in Central-Eastern Europe (Carter, 1995; Lowndes, 2008; Madrid, 2008; Webber, 2011; Pantnaik and Chalam, 1996; Bugaric, 2008) .
However, since the scholarship of party politics in Western Europe has been deeply shaped by 'methodological nationalism' (Jeffery and Wincott, 2010) , the literature on populist parties has taken the nation-state as the natural context of analysis, systematically downplaying sub-state ethno-territorial instances. Centre-periphery dynamics have been given scant attention and have popped up in the literature only incidentally: when the main interpreters of populism in a given country, such as the Vlaams Belang in Belgium and the Northern League in Italy, where
Published on-line first in Comparative European Politics (2018) Https://doi/org/10.1057/s41295-018-0142-1 also regionalist (or minority nationalist) parties (Pauwels, 2011; McDonnell, 2006; Biorcio, 2017) . As for ethnic diversity, this has been pointed out as strongly related to (right-wing) populism but almost exclusively in regard to xenophobic and/or racist claims against immigrants (Van der Brug et al., 2000; Rydgren, 2003; Albertazzi and McDonnell, 2008) . In contrast, the link between populism and ethnic divisions within the 'native' populations has remained largely unexplored in the Western European context.
Finally, while the scholarship has widely investigated the relationship between populism and Euroscepticism (Taggart, 1998; Krouwel, 2007; Ruzza, 2009; Harmsen, 2010; Tournier-Sol, 2015) , the study of such relationship has only focused on two levels-national and EU-with extremely rare works analyzing the multi-level (i.e. regional-national-EU) dynamics of the populism/Euroscepticism nexus (Mazzoleni, 2005) .
This special issue aims to directly address these lacunae within the scholarship, by investigating center-periphery relationships, ethnic cleavages and multi-level dynamics that impact upon or are informed by populist politics in Western Europe. This article opens the special issue, providing a conceptual map and an explorative comparative analysis of the relationship and linkages between populism, regionalism (or minority nationalism), majority ethno-nationalism and Euroscepticism.
In the next section, we introduce, discuss, and define the concept of populism. This is followed by a segment devoted to conceptualizing and defining specific ethno-territorial ideologiesregionalism, majority nationalism, and Euroscepticism-and highlighting the potential linkages between each of them and populism. We, then, present several ideological combinations that are reflected in the cases analyzed in the articles of this special issue. We further discuss these combinations in the final section of this introductory article.
Populism: Between thin ideology and discourse
Published on-line first in Comparative European Politics (2018) Https://doi/org/10.1057/s41295-018-0142-1 Many studies on populism tend to stress the difficulty of the scholarship to agree on a clear definition of the underlying concept (Berlin, Hofstadter and MacRae, 1968; Canovan, 1981; Taguieff, 1995; Taggart, 2000) . Leaving aside the loose use of the term made by the media (Bale at al., 2011), two main factors can be held responsible for conceptual slipperiness or disagreement in the academic debate. First, the predominance of single case-studies or region specific studies-e.g., Latin American (Di Tella, 1965; De la Torre, 2010) , Northern American (Kazin, 1998; Berlet and Lyons, 2000) , Western Europe (Betz, 1994; Taggart, 1995; Rooduijn et al., 2014; Heinisch and Mazzoleni, 2016; Akkerman, T. et al., 2017) , Central-Eastern Europe (Mudde, 2000; Minkenberg, 2002; Vujacic, 2003; Pirro, 2014) , etc.-often ignoring contributions coming from other regional-comparative studies (De la Torre, 2018). Second, a certain tendency to shift the discussion from the essence of the concept of populism to the conceptual category to which populism belongs: whether populism is an ideology (Mudde, 2004; Stanley, 2008) , a discourse (Laclau, 1977; Rooduijn and Powels, 2011) , a frame (Aslanidis, 2016; Heinisch and Mazzoleni 2017) or a strategy (Wayland, 2001; Jansen, 2011) .
However, digging beneath the surface, it is possible to identify a certain substantive convergence in how populism is conceived in the recent international scholarship (Panizza, 2005; De la Torre, 2015; Müller, 2016; Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2017) . Indeed, the distinction between strategy, discourse and frame is more superficial than substantive, given that proponents of 'populism as a strategy' include also 'populist rhetoric' (i.e. 'discourse') as a defining element of that strategy (Jansen, 2011: 83) . As for the distinction between ideology and discourse, this is typically reduced by the very advocates of 'populism as an ideology' to that of a 'thin ideology' (Stanley, 2008) . The distance between the two positions can be called into question even further by the fact that Michael Freeden himself (the 'father' of the 'thin ideology' 1 concept) has expressed doubt about populism even qualifying as an ideology at all, Published on-line first in Comparative European Politics (2018) Https://doi/org/10.1057/s41295-018-0142-1 even a thin one (Freeden, 2017) . Instead, he appears to argue in favor of populism's borderline nature in-between (thin) ideology and discourse (Freeden, 2017: 10) .
If Freeden's contribution helps us reach an acceptable middle ground in the debate on the conceptual category containing the phenomenon of populism, a certain 'center of gravity' has emerged based on the definition proposed amongst others by Cas Mudde and consisting of the following components: a) a vision of society as divided in two groups, the 'pure people' and the 'corrupt elites'; b) the internal homogeneity of the two groups; c) the antagonistic relationship between the two groups; and d) always siding with the 'pure people' as the only legitimate source of the 'general will' (Mudde, 2004: 543) . These defining criteria, advanced by a key proponent of 'populism as an ideology' are to some extent compatible with most definitions proposed by advocates of 'populism as a discourse' such as Laclau (2005) and Rooduijn and Powels (2011) as well as the advocates of 'populism as a strategy' such as Jansen (2011).
Other important elements emphasized by several authors, such as a sense of crisis (Taggart, 2000; Rooduijn, 2014) , can actually be considered contextual conditions under which a populist discourse may be more viable or successful (Kriesi and Pappas, 2015) . By contrast, other recurring elements such as the stigmatization of 'dangerous others' (Albertazzi and McDonnell, 2008 ) may be better understood as 'linkage nodes' to other (thick or thin) ideologies, such as in the connection between populism and the radical right (Betz, 1994; Rydgren, 2005) . Indeed, populism can be linked with very different ideological orientations from radical left to radical right; from inclusionary to exclusionary; from socialist to neoliberal; from secular to religious; from fanaticism for charismatic leadership to fanaticism for grassroots democracy (Otjes and Louwerse, 2015; March, 2017) .
The fact that populism can connect with completely different (and even contrasting) ideological orientations is also due to its intrinsic ambivalence (Taggart, 2000; Heinisch and Mazzoleni Published on-line first in Comparative European Politics (2018) Https://doi/org/10.1057/s41295-018-0142-1 2017). Populist claims are, by definition, ambivalent because the key concepts of populism are not sufficiently defined: 'the people' are depicted as a homogeneous and amorphous group generally without differences of interest and class. In fact, the way populists conceive of the group making up the 'elites' may be even more vague and entirely situational. Therefore, ambivalence may be considered as a key characteristic of populism, providing strategic flexibility and adaptability as well as a major source of diffusion of populist discourse among political actors. This means that, while there are parties for which populism represents their core ideology/discourse, it is much more likely to find parties that engage in a populist discourse informed by a different (more or less well defined) ideological position, or parties that forge a synthesis between populism and another ideology.
Since, this special issue is concerned with the linkages between populism and the ethnoterritorial (thin) ideologies, particular attention is devoted to recognizing which ideological/discursive elements in the empirical cases are distinctively populist, which ones come from ethno-territorial ideologies and what the linkage nodes are. This will allow distinguishing, for instance, between primarily populist parties engaging with regionalist claims and primarily regionalist parties using a populist discourse. It will also allow for the exploration of how the populist actors cope with the challenges arising from the ambivalence rooted in their often contradictory ideological patchwork, e.g. populism and regionalism and state-nationalism. We now turn to introducing the key ideological elements of regionalism, majority (or state) nationalism, and Euroscepticism, thus completing the conceptual map that we set out to provide.
Ethno-territorial ideologies and their potential links with populism
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Regionalism
Regionalism can be defined as a thin ideology that politicizes the specificities of the population living in a certain sub-state region vis-à-vis the population of the state as a whole (Fitjar, 2010) .
These specificities, which can be socio-cultural (language, religion, prevailing ideological orientations, etc.) and/or socio-economic (type and level of economic development, prevalent economic sectors, economic status of the region vis-à-vis the rest of state, etc.), are seen as the bases of a separate ethno-territorial identity which should be formally recognized and accommodated by the state. Indeed, regionalist parties are defined as those self-contained political organizations that focus on the protection/enhancement of regional identities and interests, challenging the central state with their requests for some kind of territorial selfgovernment (De Winter, 1998; Massetti, 2009; Alonso, 2012; Mazzoleni and Mueller, 2017) .
The level of self-government claimed by regionalist parties can vary considerably. In this respect, Massetti and Schakel (2016) have identified a crucial distinction between those regionalist parties that pose a threat to the territorial integrity of the state ('secessionist') and those that do not ('autonomist'), highlighting how regionalist parties can change their claims over time. In addition, Dandoy (2010) has highlighted much more stable differences within the 'secessionist' category, distinguishing between 'independentist', 'irredentist', and 'rattachist' parties.
Adopting a different terminology, some scholars prefer to distinguish between 'regionalist' and 'stateless nationalist' (or 'minority nationalist') parties (Hepburn, 2009; Elias, 2009 ). However, the distinction seems to defy a persuasive definition and, in the end, the little value added by this distinction is attested by the fact that the very proponents consider both regionalist and stateless nationalist parties as belonging to one same party family (Hepburn, 2009 ). We, therefore, treat stateless (or minority) nationalism as an internal sub-category of regionalismdenotating those cases in which a claim to nationhood is made-bearing in mind that it does Published on-line first in Comparative European Politics (2018) Https://doi/org/10.1057/s41295-018-0142-1 not necessarily coincide with the sub-category of secessionism. Like populism, regionalism can (and does) also combine itself with all sorts of ideological orientations, from the radicalleft to the radical-right (Massetti, 2009; Massetti and Shakel, 2015) . The linkages with populism can happen therefore within a broader ideological outlook.
The most basic and most evident connection between regionalism and populism resides in the potential correspondence between the two foundational dichotomies: 'people vs. elites' can be equated to 'region (or minority nation) vs. state' and vice versa. In the regionalist-populist synthesis, the 'good people' are the people in the region, while the elites are the politicians defending state interests at the expenses of the regional population. Regionalist populists typically focus on the putative incapacity or unwillingness of national elites in the far away capital to recognize, understand, and even consider the specific needs of the region. As highlighted by Taggart (2000) , populist discourse often refers to a lost 'heartland'. Indeed, the politics of resentment and victimization, so typical of populism, might resonate well with ethno-regional minorities that perceive a lack of recognition or fair treatment of their region by the state elites. Given the structural antagonism between regionalist parties and the (statewide parties') politicians that run the state, we can expect to find this minimal level of populist discourse in virtually all regionalist parties. Similarly, we can expect a regional populist party, or a particularly autonomous regional branch of a statewide populist party, to back-up their criticism of elites with a regionalist discourse. It is worth pointing out that both regionalist and populist parties can antagonize not only the state political elites but, where a regional government is in place, also the regional political elites. Whether the regionalist populist synthesis will target only the state elites or both the regional and state elites, will depend primarily on the role of the party in the regional and national party system (fringe party, relevant but not in office, relevant and in office, hegemonic and continuously in office) and by
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Besides this basic connection, populism and regionalism can combine within the frame of a broader ideological orientation. In these cases, the political actors forging the regionalist populist synthesis may target not only (or not primarily) political elites but also economic and/or intellectual elites. In addition, regionalist populists can target not only regional and state elites but also supra-national and international ones (Mazzoleni, 2005) . In Laclau's terms (2005) , they can challenge what they perceive as the dominant elite discourse from different ideological standpoints-e.g., challenging a dominant liberal/tolerant/pluralist discourse from a radical-right standpoint, or a dominant neoliberal/economic conservative discourse from a radical left standpoint, etc.).
Special mention should be made of a particular category of regionalist parties-unionist regionalist parties-that operate in ethnically divided regions and often find themselves fighting on two fronts. These parties are as much assertive advocates of a distinct regional identity and regional self-government as they are staunch supporters of state territorial integrity against other ethno-regionalist (potentially or openly secessionist) movements/parties that have claims on the same region (Massetti, 2009: 504) . In a way, like all regionalist parties, they are in a bargaining (and sometimes confrontational) relationship with the state for attaining a certain degree of self-government. At the same time, they fully side with the state against secessionist threats involving their region and mobilize people based on alternative ethnoregional identities. It should be noted that highly autonomous regional branches of a statewide parties can also engage in this type of two-front battles. Indeed, some of these parties can enter into close agreements with (majority nationalist) statewide parties, thus becoming de-facto their regional branchese.g., the agreements between the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) and the
British Conservative Party in Northern Ireland and between Union of Navarrese People (UPN)
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When they act as regionalist parties, 'the people' are likely to be (a particular ethnic group or) the regional population. If they act as regional agents of majority (state) nationalism, 'the people' will probably coincide with the majority (state) nation.
State (or Majority) Nationalism
Nationalism is widely considered as a thin ideology which prioritizes national divisions over other political issues and promotes the own nation vis-à-vis other nations (Freeden, 1998) . State nationalism is the ideology at the basis of the (putative) nation-state: the nation is presented as the social pre-requisite and justification for the state; while the latter is seen as the political/institutional instrument of the former. If the nation-state project is not internally contested, state nationalism remains an implicit or dormant ideology. If the nation-state project is internally contested, different scenarios open up, depending primarily on the level of democracy of the political system and on the mobilization strategies of ethno-regionalist forces.
Advanced liberal democracies tend of acknowledge the legitimate presence of ethno-regional identities that are uneasy with a strict pursuit/upholding of the nation-state project. Within the resulting democratic dialectic, some political forces can voice their resistance against this pluralist revision of the nation-state project. Therefore, in these cases, state nationalism remains a particularly potent force in the form of majority nationalism. 2 The main concern of majority nationalists is the mobilization of ethno-territorial identities by regionalist parties/movements.
In particular, majority nationalists tend to target ethno-territorial minorities that are perceived as a threat to national integrity, either because of their own strength or because there are protected/supported by a neighboring (kin) state. In theory, majority nationalist parties can have different ideological orientations along the left-right continuum. However, in the context Published on-line first in Comparative European Politics (2018) Https://doi/org/10.1057/s41295-018-0142-1 of liberal democracies, parties situated on the right of the political spectrum-particularly conservative and radical-right parties-tend to engage more with majority nationalism. Therefore, the populist-nationalist synthesis tends to manifest itself as a form of right-wing populism (Loch, 2017) .
The most obvious linkage between majority nationalism and populism may be found in the identification of the (majority) nation as 'the good people', intended as a homogeneous group that does not allow internal (ethno-territorial) differentiation (Muller, 2016) : either a person/group is in or is out of the 'nation-people'. So, while the main 'enemies' of majority nationalist are the regionalist (particularly secessionist) political forces, in their populistnationalist synthesis the targeted elites are the national parties and cultural elites that are perceived to be softer vis-a-vis regionalist claims. Accusations made against these elites (which might include also international or supra-national elements) may range from being insufficiently assertive/resolute in protecting the unity and integrity of the nation-state to a full betrayal of the nation-state. It goes without saying that, beyond fighting against mobilized ethno-regional identities, majority nationalist parties also want to protect the national identity from the supposed threats posed by immigrant communities. In this case, their majority nationalism and exclusivist/xenophobic nativism results in the adoption of a radical-right ideology (Mudde, 2007) . The populist radical-right synthesis thus presents the 'good people', understood as the majority/native nation (to the exclusion of ethno-territorial minorities and immigrant communities), against the 'corrupt elites', understood as those (pluralist and multiculturalist) political forces that do not protect (or work against) the homogeneity/purity of the nation. 3
Euroscepticism
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It can also aim outward and upward by identifying international and/or supra-national actors that are accused of conspiring against the interests of the nation-state and depriving the nationpeople of their sovereignty. In this case, the linkage with populism is rather immediate because the influence of external elites (usually helped by internal elites) is seen as diminishing the people's sovereignty. While general 'sovereignism' tends to target the main actors of globalization-such as transnational economic elites and international institutions (e.g., the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund)-in Europe sovereigntist political forces tend to direct their recriminations against European integration and its creature, the European Union (EU). Euroscepticism can be seen, therefore, as a particular case of sovereignism and, in turn, a particular expression of state nationalism.
Scholarship has identified different degrees and forms of Euroscepticism. The Sussex school distinguishes between 'soft' and 'hard' Euroscepticism, whereby the former is defined as a qualified criticism of some EU policies (or integration in some policy areas) and the latter as an outright claim against EU membership (Taggart, 1998; Szczerbiak and Taggart, 2008) . In contrast, Kopecky and Mudde (2002) distinguish between political forces that oppose the very idea of European integration (Eurorejects) and those that, albeit supporting the principle of European integration, openly criticize the way in which it has been actualized (Eurosceptic).
Like the other ethno-territorial ideologies, Euroscepticism can, in theory, combine itself with all types of leftist and rightist ideologies. In fact, empirical studies have found that Euroscepticism tends to connect itself primarily with radical-left and radical-right ideologies (Hix, 1999; Hooghe et al., 2002) . In particular, hard and/or principled Euroscepticism tends to be found primarily among radical-right parties (Vasilopoulou, 2011; whereas radicalleft parties tend to manifest primarily forms of criticism for the way the EU has been shaped (e.g. its allegedly neo-liberal ethos).
